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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

LANCE MICHAEL WEEKS,

:
:

CaseNo.990979-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

On appeal, Defendant Lance Michael Weeks ("Weeks") is challenging the trial
court's order of restitution in the amount of $9,104.35 on the grounds that the order is
not based in reliable information, and/or the trial court refused to provide Weeks with a
"full hearing" on the matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(e) (Supp. 1998).
(Brief of Appellant at 2.) Specifically, the trial court relied on double-hearsay statements
in the presentence investigation report to calculate and order the restitution amount.
Weeks objected to the amount and requested a "full hearing" on the matter in order to
examine the basis for the award. The trial court denied Weeks' request.
In response to the challenges on appeal, the state acknowledges that in connection
with Weeks' request for a "full hearing" on the issue of restitution, the trial court
conducted a hearing, but took "no evidence" on the matter. (State's Brief of Appellee
("S.B.") at 9.) The state also does not dispute that the trial court based the restitution
award on unreliable information.
However, in urging affirmance on appeal, the state argues that Weeks' objection

and request for a "full hearing" was untimely. According to the state, a defendant must
make such an objection "at the time of sentencing" or the matter is waived. (S.B. at 1112.) The state relies on Section 76-3-201 and Utah case law to support its position.
As more fully set forth herein, Weeks timely objected and requested a "foil
hearing" under the statute in connection with the restitution order. In addition, the trial
court considered the merits of the matter in denying the request for a "foil hearing."
Since the trial court addressed the merits of the request, the issue is properly before this
Court. Inasmuch as the state does not dispute that the trial court failed to provide Weeks
with a "foil hearing," Weeks respectfully urges this Court to reverse and remand the case
for further proceedings.
ARGUMENT
THE STATE DOES NOT DISPUTE THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE FAILED
TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 76-3-201.
A. THE STATE DOES NOT DISPUTE THAT THE TRIAL COURT FAILED
TO PROVIDE A "FULL HEARING" ON THE ISSUE OF RESTITUTION;
RATHER. THE STATE CLAIMS WEEKS DID NOT TIMELY OBJECT TO
THE MATTER.
As set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant, during sentencing the trial judge in
this case ordered Weeks to pay restitution in the amount of $9,104.35. The amount was
based on double-hearsay statements presented to the trial judge in a presentence
investigation report. (See Brief of Appellant at 14; see also Presentence Investigation
Report at 8-10; R. 60:4-5.)
Weeks objected to the order of restitution and requested a "full hearing" pursuant

to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(e). (Case No. 2830:37; Case No. 3049:41; Case No.
3239:39; and R. 60.) Thereafter, at a hearing, Weeks challenged the reliability of the
information allegedly supporting the restitution award, and he requested the opportunity
to examine the information purportedly supporting the alleged damages in order that he
may assess its accuracy. (R. 60:5-7.) The trial judge denied Weeks' requests and ruled
that the restitution award was fair and reasonable. (R. 60:7.)
The state does not dispute that the trial judge failed to provide Weeks with a "full
hearing" on the matter, or that the award of restitution was based on double-hearsay
statements. Indeed, the state acknowledges that a defendant's due process rights and ,
statutory rights are protected so long as "defendant has the opportunity to examine and
challenge the information on which his sentence is based." (S.B. at 10.) In this case, the
trial court denied Weeks such an opportunity, thereby violating his due process and
statutory rights.
While the state does not take issue with the merits of Weeks' claims, the state
challenges the procedural posture of the matter. Specifically, the state asserts that
Weeks' statutory and due process rights were not violated in this case where Weeks
"neither requested a restitution hearing nor challenged the factual basis of the trial court's
restitution order at the time of sentencing." (S.B. at 11.) According to the state, "any
defendant who wishes to challenge a trial court's restitution order must make his
objection known at the time he is sentenced in order to preserve his right to a full hearing
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on the issue." (S.B. at 11.) The state asserts this Court should decline to reach the merits
of Weeks' issue on appeal on the basis that Weeks "waived his right to a restitution
hearing" when he filed an objection and requested the hearing 11 days after sentencing.
(S.B. at 11.)
The state's argument is unpersuasive for at least three reasons: First, the trial
judge in this matter considered the merits of Weeks' request for a "full hearing" and
denied the request on the grounds that the restitution award was fair and reasonable.
Under those circumstances this Court will not find waiver, but will consider the merits of
the issue on appeal. Second, Section 76-3-201 does not provide that a defendant who
fails to object to the imposition of or amount in restitution "at the time of sentencing" has
waived his right to a "full hearing." In the event this Court interprets the statute in such a
manner, the interpretation may present an unworkable approach to sentencing
proceedings that conflicts with due process considerations. Third, the state has cited to
case law purportedly supporting its interpretation of Section 76-3-20 l(4)(e) that failure
to request a full hearing "at the time of sentencing" constitutes waiver. Those cases do
not support that position. They support the fundamental proposition that an appellate
court will not review an issue on appeal where the lower court was not given the
opportunity first to consider and correct the error. That is not an issue in this case.
Inasmuch as the state has not disputed the merits of Weeks' claim on appeal, he
urges this Court to remand the matter for a "full hearing" on the restitution issue.

4

1. This Court Does Not Need to Consider the State's "Waiver" Argument Since
the Trial Court Considered Weeks' Request for a "Full Hearing" on the Merits.
On September 10, 1999, the trial judge entered an order of restitution in the
underlying cases. (See Envelope containing "Documents From Case No. 991902297,"
page 2; Case No. 2830:33-36; Case No. 3239:37-38; Case No. 3049:39-40.) Thereafter,
on September 21, Weeks objected to the order and requested a "full hearing." (R. Case
No. 2830:37; Case No. 3239:39; Case No. 3049:41.)
On October 18, the trial judge held a hearing (R. 60). In disposing of Weeks'
objection and request, the trial judge "did not rely on waiver, but addressed the merits of
the issue." State v. Johnson. 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991). That is, the judge
considered argument from counsel, described his calculation for the restitution amount,
acknowledged relying on statements in the presentence investigation report in making his
determination, and refused to allow Weeks the opportunity to consider or examine the
factual basis for the restitution award. (R. 60.) The judge also ruled that the amount in
restitution was "fair and reasonable." (R. 60.)
Where the trial judge has addressed the issues fully and has not relied on waiver,
"we consider the issue on appeal" — even if trial counsel arguably failed to properly
preserve the issue. Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1161.
One of the primary reasons for imposing waiver rules like rule 103(a)(1) is to
assure that the trial court has the first opportunity to address a claim that it erred.
If the trial court already has had that opportunity, the justification for rigid waiver
requirements is weakened considerably.

5

Id
In the underlying cases in this matter, the trial court gave no indication that it had
considered rejecting, or would reject, Weeks' objections and request for a full hearing on
the grounds that the motion was untimely or that Weeks waived such a request. (See R.
60 generally.) Thus, the problem with the state's waiver argument is that whatever the
alleged requirements of Section 76-3-20 l(4)(e), the trial judge chose not to treat Weeks'
alleged failure to raise the issue "at the time of sentencing" as a waiver. "Instead, he
proceeded to consider the claim. Therefore, the objection was preserved for appeal. The
judge effectively waived the requirements of [the rule.]" State v. Matsamas. 808 P.2d
1048, 1053 (Utah 1991); State v. Belgard. 830 P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 1992); State v.
Seale, 853 P.2d 862, 870 (Utah 1993) (court's consideration of the merits of the matter rather than finding waiver - ensures defendant's right to taive the merits of the issue
reviewed on appeal). Contrary to the state's assertion, this Court may consider the merits
of the issue on appeal and reverse the matter for a "full hearing" in accordance with
Section 76-3-20 l(4)(e).
2. The Statute Does Not Provide that if Defendant Fails to Object to the
Restitution Amount at the Time of Sentencing, He Has Waived the Matter.
According to the state, if defendant fails to object to the restitution order "at the
time of sentencing," he waives his right to a "full hearing." (S.B. at 11.) In support of
that position, the state relies on Section 76-3-20l(4)(e), which provides the following: "If
a defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court
6

shall at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue." Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(e) (Supp. 1998). The state seems to argue that the phrase "at
the time of sentencing" relates to the timing of defendant's objection. Yet, it does not.
Indeed, the provision is silent with respect to when defendant must object, and it in no
way suggests that a failure to object "at the time of sentencing" constitutes waiver.
The phrase "at the time of sentencing" seems to relate to the trial court. That is,
Section 76-3-20 l(4)(e) requires the trial court to provide a "full hearing" once defendant
objects to the imposition or amount in restitution. While the statute may be construed to
require the trial court to provide a "full hearing" on the matter "at the time of
sentencing," such a requirement would be impractical and problematic.
Consider the manner in which trial courts proceed with sentencing, and the
requirements of a "full hearing."
On the one hand, a "full hearing" contemplates fairness, and that a defendant will
have the opportunity to present evidence in the form of documents, and/or testimony
from witnesses, and to examine and challenge the accuracy of the factual information
upon which sentencing determinations are made. See State v. Starnes, 841 P.2d 712
(Utah App. 1992) ("full hearing" contemplates opportunity for defendant to present
evidence as well as examine state evidence). The "full hearing" accommodates due
process at sentencing, where criminal proceedings must be conducted to ensure that the
decision-making process is based upon accurate and reliable information. State v.
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Gomez. 887 P.2d 853, 854-55 (Utah 1994); State v. Johnson.. 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah
1993) (cites omitted); State v. Howell 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985) (Article 1, Section
7 of Utah Constitution requires sentencing judge to act on reliable, relevant information
in exercising discretion in sentencing); State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1248-49 (Utah
1980); see also State v. Casarez. 656 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Utah 1982) (court must interpret
statutory provisions to be consistent with constitutional safeguards); State v. Patience,
944 P.2d 381, 389 (Utah App. 1997). It contemplates that defendant will have the
opportunity to investigate his objections to the restitution order.
On the other hand, in accordance with the practice in this state, restitution is
imposed at the time of sentencing. (See Envelope containing "Documents From Case
No. 991902297," page 2; R. Case No. 3239:37-38; Case No. 2830:33-36; Case No.
3049:39:40.) Thus, an objection to the imposition of or amount in restitution may
become an issue only after sentencing. That is, a defendant cannot be expected to object
to restitution unless and until it is imposed against him. Once it is imposed at sentencing,
it is reasonable to allow counsel the opportunity to investigate the matter to determine
whether the amount is objectionable. See Utah R. Prof. Cond. 3.1 (2000) (a lawyer shall
not bring or defend a proceeding or assert or controvert an issue unless there is a basis
that is not frivolous); see also Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1028 n. 9 (Utah 1996)
(in determining the amount in restitution, the Board of Pardons and Parole would hold a
hearing after providing appropriate notice to defendant and access to investigative
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materials for presentation of evidence).
Thus, if this Court were to construe the statute to provide a defendant with a "foil
hearing" on restitution only "at the time of sentencing," such an interpretation would be
unreasonable, burdensome, and excessive. It would require the parties and court to
anticipate a foil evidentiary hearing at every sentencing, without knowing in advance
how the trial court intended to calculate restitution, the basis for the order, or the amount
the trial court intended to impose. Defendant would not have the ability to investigate
the matter and to assess the evidentiary issues to be addressed. Rather, in anticipation of
every possible challenge to what may be ordered, the defendant and state would have to
arrange the attendance of witnesses and victims even before it is known whether the trial
judge intended to impose restitution and in what amount.
Such an interpretation would disrupt and congest the system as well as impose an
undue burden on victims and other third-party witnesses. In the event the trial court
determined not to impose restitution, or imposed it in an amount that was not
objectionable, the disruption would prove to be a waste of time for those who came
prepared to testify on the chance that a "foil hearing" would be necessary to the matter.
That is not a reasonable interpretation of Section 76-3-20 l(4)(e).
Rather, a more reasoned interpretation of the provision would require this Court to
consider the language of the Section 76-3-20 l(4)(e) in light of its purpose. That is, the
phrase "at the time of sentencing" relates to the timing of the trial court's notice
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concerning the "full hearing." The provision ensures that the trial court will provide
notice "at the time of sentencing" that a full hearing will be allowed. The phrase
provides an assurance to defendant of no undue or unreasoneible delay in allowing the
"full hearing." Thus, when a defendant objects to restitution, the trial court shall provide
notice to the defendant at the time of sentence that it will hold the "full hearing" on the
issue. Under that interpretation, the phrase "at the time of sentencing" emphasizes the
importance of the matter to the trial court in scheduling it without undue delay.
Such an interpretation would identify the importance of that phrase and the fact
that it is directed to the trial court. If the defendant objected postorder, after an
investigation into the matter, the trial court would not be required to provide notice of the
full hearing "at the time of sentencing," but would be required to provide notice of the
"full hearing" on the matter within a reasonable time of defendant's objection.
That interpretation of Section 76-3-20 l(4)(e) would be consistent with treatment
of other sentencing statutes. In State v. Helm. 563 P.2d 794 (Utah 1977), the Utah
Supreme Court considered Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-1 (1953 as amended). The statute
provided that after a guilty verdict, "the court must appoint a time for pronouncing
judgment, which must be at least two days and not more than ten days after the verdict."
Id. at 797 (quoting § 77-35-1) (emphasis added). The defendant in Helm argued that the
trial court's failure to pronounce sentence within the time mandated by the statute
deprived the trial court of jurisdiction over the matter. Id_at 797. The supreme court
disagreed and construed the language of the statute as follows:
10

[This] statute should be viewed in harmony with the general rule of statutory
construction: that it should be interpreted and applied in light of its purpose. That
purpose was that there should be no undue or [unreasonable] delay in the
pronouncement of the sentence, particularly that there should be no imposition of
hardship on the defendant or prejudicial effect upon his rights. Consistent with
what has been said, we think the view which is sound and which comports with
the requirements of justice is that the limits so prescribed in the statute are not
mandatory and jurisdictional, but are directory; and that where the sentence is
imposed within a reasonable time so that there is no abuse of the court's power
nor adverse effects upon the defendant, he should not be entitled to go free, but
should be entitled to have the correct sentence imposed upon him, with due
consideration given to any time he may have served because of the delay.
I d at 797 (footnote omitted).
In this matter, Section 76-3-20 l(4)(e) should not be construed as a bar against the
defendant in objecting to the order of restitution so long as defendant's objection is made
within a reasonable time. Indeed, the statute does not specify that a defendant has waived
his right to such a full hearing "by failing to request it at the time of sentencing." (S.B. at
11.) Further, while nothing in the record suggests that Weeks' objection to restitution 11
days after sentencing had any adverse effect on the court, the state, or the victims, the
failure to provide the "full hearing" adversely affected Weeks' due process rights. See
State v. Casarez. 656 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Utah 1982) (court must interpret statutory
provisions to avoid potential constitutional conflicts); State v. Howell 707 P.2d 115, 118
(Utah 1985) (Article 1, Section 7 of Utah Constitution requires sentencing judge to act
on reliable, relevant information in exercising discretion in sentencing); Lipsky, 608 P.2d
at 1248-49; see also Casarez. 656 P.2d at 1007; State v. Patience. 944 P.2d 381, 389
(UtahApp. 1997).
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The provision should be construed to mean that when a defendant requests a "full
hearing/' there should be no undue or unreasonable delay in the process; there should be
no imposition of hardship on the defendant or victims, or prejudicial effect upon
defendant's rights. The provision is not mandatory but directory in terms of the timing,
and where a request for a "fiill hearing" is made within a reasonable time of the
imposition of restitution, defendant shall be entitled to such a hearing within a reasonable
time with due consideration given to the need to investigate the matter and to present and
examine evidence.
Finally, to the extent this Court determines that Weeks' request was untimely
under Section 76-3-20 l(4)(e), this Court may disregard the form of the request for its
substance to find that the rules of criminal procedure accommodate the request for a "full
hearing" where a defendant may request at any time that a trial court correct an illegal
sentence. _See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) (2000).
In this case, an illegal sentence was issued where the trial court imposed
restitution based on double-hearsay statements. (See Brief of Appellant at 8-20.) Such
statements "cannot stand alone as the basis for sentencing." Johnson. 856 P.2d at 1071.
Also, Weeks was not allowed to examine the information purportedly supporting the
restitution amount. Such information should have been made available to Weeks in
connection with an evidentiary hearing on the matter where he would have the
opportunity to consider the basis for the award and challenge the accuracy of the amount.
That is consistent with the requests made in this case.
12

Since a motion to correct an illegal sentence may be made at any time, see State v.
Lee Lim, 7 P.2d 825, 826 (Utah 1932) (a district court may reassume jurisdiction to
correct sentence), it may serve as an appropriate method for requesting the hearing in this
matter.
For the reasons set forth herein, Section 76-3-20 l(4)(e) should not be construed as
a rule of limitations against defendant, and should not serve to bar objections brought
within a reasonable period of time.
3. The Cases Relied Upon by the State Do Not Support the Determination that a
Defendant Who Fails to Object "at the Time of Sentencing," Has Waived his
Right to a "Full Hearing."
The state has cited to Monson v. Carver. 928 P.2d 1017, 1029 (Utah 1996), and
State v. Snvder, 747 P.2d 417, 421 (Utah 1987), for the proposition that a defendant must
make his objection to restitution "at the time he is sentenced in order to preserve his right
to a full hearing on the issue." (S.B. at ll.) 1 Those cases do not stand for that
proposition.
Indeed, consideration of Monson supports the determination that defendant may
be allowed a "full hearing" on the issue of restitution even where defendant failed to
make such a request to the tribunal that issued the restitution order.
In that case, the Board of Pardons and Parole held a hearing in November 1992

l The state also has relied on State v. Haga. 954 P.2d 1284, 1289 (Utah App. 1998). That
case supports the determination that a defendant who requests a "full hearing" is entitled
to such.
13

concerning Monson's parole. Thereafter, the Board issued a formal order granting a
parole date and imposing parole conditions, which in part required Monson to "pay
restitution in an amount to be determined." Monson, 928 P.2d at 1021. Monson did not
object to the order and he did not request that the Board hold a hearing on the matter.
Monson, 928 P.2d at 1029. Rather, in January 1993, Monson filed a pro se petition with
the district court, and in November 1993, with the assistance of counsel, Monson filed an
amended petition for extraordinary relief alleging among other things that the Board
failed to comply with Utah statutory law in ordering restitution. Li. at 1021, 1029.
Monson relied on Section 76-3-201, and claimed that the Board failed to consider
mandatory statutory factors in ordering restitution, and it denied him a "full hearing" on
the matter as permitted by § 76-3-20l(4)(e). See Monson, 928 P.2d at 1028-29.
The supreme court agreed with Monson on the first point: "The record in this case
does not demonstrate that the Board considered the statutory factors because it does not
contain any explanation of the reasons the Board ordered Monson to pay restitution." Id.
at 1028. The supreme court remanded the case to the trial court with orders that the
Board must give an explanation of its restitution order taking into account the statutory
factors. "In so doing, the Board will no doubt determine the amount of restitution to be
ordered." Id.
In considering Monson's second point, the supreme court ruled there was no error
in failing to provide a "full hearing" since Monson never made an objection to the Board
or requested the hearing. Rather, Monson filed a petition with the trial court.
14

Id. at

1029. The supreme court's ruling in that regard was consistent with the fundamental
principle that an appellate court will notfinderror if defendant has failed to allow the
trial court the opportunity to address the matter in the first instance.
In making that determination, the supreme court did not indicate that Monson had
lost all rights to a "full hearing" on the matter for failing to object in connection with the
Board proceedings. Rather, in order to accommodate the statute and Monson's due
process rights, the court stated that Monson would be entitled to a "full hearing" when
the Board specified an amount in restitution. Id. Thus, it seems Monson would be
allowed the "full hearing," where the restitution issue was remanded on thefirstpoint
and it was expected that the Board would determine the amount of restitution. Id. at
1028-29.
In Monson, defendant failed to request a "full hearing" with the Board, as he
should have. Yet, that did not deprive Monson of the right to such a hearing. In
addition, the supreme court did not construe Section 76-3-20l(4)(e) to bar Monson's
right to a "full hearing" based on his failure to object in connection with the Board
proceedings. This Court likewise should not construe the statute in such a manner.
Next, in Snyder, 747 P.2d at 421, after the trial court ordered defendant to pay
restitution, defendant failed to lodge any objection to the imposition, amount, or
distribution of the restitution ordered. Id_ Thus, in accordance with fundamental legal
principles, the Utah Supreme Court determined that defendant waived his right to
challenge the order of restitution. IdL The court did not consider the timing of the
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objection in the trial court for purposes of a "full hearing."
In this case, Weeks made a request for a "full hearing" within a reasonable time of
the trial court's order on restitution. The trial court failed to allow a "full hearing." The
appropriate remedy here is to remand the case and to order the trial court to give Weeks a
"full hearing" on the matter. See Monson. 928 P.2d at 1028-29.
B. WEEKS' CLAIM CONCERNING THE FACTORS SET FORTH AT
SECTION 76-3-20If8Vc) IS GOVERNED BY MONSON AND ROBERTSON.
In response to Weeks' claim that the trial judge failed to take into consideration
the factors set forth at Section 76-3-20 l(8)(c) (Brief of Appellant at 17-20), the state
again asserts that Weeks failed to timely object to the trial court's order and/or Weeks
waived the issue on appeal. In addition, the state asserts that the trial court complied
with the statute in issuing the restitution order. The state disregards relevant case law on
the matter in making its assertions, as set forth below.
1. The Statutory Law and Case Law Provide that the Trial Court Must Make
Explicit Findings in the Record with Regard to the Statutory Factors in Ordering
Restitution.
As set forth in the opening Brief of Appellant, Section 76-3-20 l(8)(c) provides
that the court must consider the following factors in determining restitution: (1) The
defendant's financial resources and the burden that restitution will impose on defendant's
other obligations; (2) The defendant's ability to pay restitution; (3) The rehabilitative
effect on the defendant of restitution payments; and (4) Other circumstances which make
restitution inappropriate. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(8)(c) (Supp. 1998). Also, "[if] the
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court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this subsection, the
court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of the court record." Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-20l(4)(d)(i) (Supp 1998).
Utah case law supports the determination that explicit consideration of the above
factors is mandatory, and must be set forth in the record.
As set forth above (point A.3., supra), in Monson v. Carver, the Board of Pardons
and Parole issued an order fixing defendant's parole date and imposing conditions on
parole. The Board ordered Monson to pay restitution in an amount to be determined.
Monson, 928 P.2d at 1021. Monson did not object to the Board's ruling. Monson, 928
P.2d at 1029. Rather, he filed a petition for extraordinary relief with the trial court and
alleged that the Board "failed to comply with certain procedural requirements when it
ordered restitution." IdLat 1021. The trial court rejected Monson's claims.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court considered provisions set forth at § 76-3-201,
which require the trial court to take into account the four specific factors in assessing
restitution, and recognized that according to the statute, if restitution is ordered the trial
court "shall make the reasons for the decision a part of the court record." Monson, 928
P.2d at 1028.2 The supreme court reversed and remanded the case in order that the Board

2 The statutory provisions at § 76-3-201 have been renumbered. In prior Utah case law,
the four statutory factors appeared at Section 76-3-201(4)(c), and the provision requiring
the trial court to "make the reasons for the [restitution] decision a part of the court
record" appeared at Section 76-3-201(4)(d). In 1999, when Weeks was sentenced, the
four statutory factors appeared at Section 76-3-20 l(8)(c). That subsection is
incorporated by reference into subsection (4), which requires the trial court to determine
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could "comply with the statute by giving Monson an explanation of its decision which
demonstrates that it has taken into account the appropriate statutory factors." IdLat 102829.
In State v. Robertson. 932 P.2d 1219, 1233-34 (Utah 1997), the Utah Supreme
Court again considered the statutory requirements imposed on the trial court in assessing
restitution. Id In that case, the trial court ordered defendant to pay restitution for costs
incurred in connection with extradition. Defendant appealed the order on the basis that
the trial court failed to consider "his financial history and impecunious status" as
required under Section 76-3-20l(4)(c). See note 2, supra. The supreme court reiterated
that according to the statute,"before ordering restitution, the court must take into account
the financial resources of defendant. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-20 l(4)(c)(i), 77-32a-3.
Moreover, when the court determines whether restitution of extradition costs is
appropriate, 'the court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of the court record.'
Id. § 76-3-201(4)(d)(i)." Id at 1234 (footnote omitted).
The supreme court found that the trial court in that matter failed to make the
appropriate findings in connection with the restitution of extradition costs. The court
declined to infer such findings from the record:
Although the trial judge did not specifically state that he considered Robertson's
financial condition in ordering restitution, as a general rule, "this court upholds

restitution "as provided in Subsection (8)." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(c) (Supp.
1998). Also, according to subsection (4)(d), the trial court "shall make the reasons for the
decision a part of the court record." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(d) (Supp. 1998).
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the trial court even if it failed to make findings on the record whenever it would
be reasonable to assume that the court actually made such findings." Ramirez, 817
P.2d at 788 n.6 (Utah 1991). As we discussed above, there are limited instances
in which this assumption should not be made: when an ambiguity of the facts
makes the assumption unreasonable, id. at 788, if the statute explicitly provides
that written findings must be made, Labrum, 925 P.2d at 939-40, or when a prior
case states that findings on a particular issue must be made to impress upon the
trial court the importance of the issue so as to ensure that we can properly perform
our appellate review function, see Nelson, 725 P.2d at 1356 n. 3. [Imposing] of
restitution of extradition costs falls under the Labrum exception.
Id. at 1234 (bold emphasis added).
According to Robertson and pursuant to Subsections 76-3-201(8)(c) and (4)(d), in
considering the four factors relevant to imposition of restitution "the trial court must take
the additional step of explicitly noting on the record the reasons for the decision it
reached, reflecting the detailed factors listed in the statute." Robertson. 932 P.2d at 1234.
In Weeks' case, the state admits that in connection with ordering restitution, the
trial court did not "specifically address[] its reasons for restitution." (S.B. at 18); see
Robertson. 932 P.2d at 1234 (where trial court "did not discuss on the record the reasons
for ordering restitution of extradition costs" the matter would be vacated and remanded
for further proceedings). Indeed, the order of restitution here appears almost as an
afterthought, where the trial judge simply stated, "And I will further order that you pay
restitution in the amount of $9,104.35, that you pay a recoupment fee for the use of your
publicly provided lawyer of $250, and I will recommend while you're there that you
receive substance abuse therapy." (R. 70:Tab 2:10.)
Nevertheless, the state asserts the following statement made by the judge reflects
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consideration of the factors: "There's no mystery about the fact that I'm going to
obviously commit you to prison, which is probably where you need to be, at least until
you get your head on straight. You've taken now since you were 14 to develop this style
of living, it's going to take you a while to undevelop it." (R. 70:Tab 2:9.) Those statements relate to the fact that the judge intended to send Weeks to prison for the crimes.
The state also suggests that the "additional step of explicitly noting on the record
the reasons for the [restitution] decision," Robertson. 932 P.2d at 1234, may be inferred
from the fact that the presentence investigation report contained information relating to
Weeks' dismal job history. (S.B. 19-20.) The report reflects that as a juvenile, Weeks
held five separate jobs for short periods of time that paid from 25 cents per delivery to
$5.50 an hour. With respect to each job, Weeks was employed for a few months and
then was fired or quit. Also, Weeks was "kicked out" of his parents' home at age 13, he
believed the "highest grade he actually completed was the eighth," he was ordered to pay
restitution in several other cases, and he presently had no income or assets. (Presentence
Investigation Report, dated 5-30-99, at 9-11, 13-17.)
It is not clear whether, or to what extent, the trial court took into account Weeks'
lack of financial resources, his inability to pay, or the other court-ordered financial
obligations set forth in the presentence investigation report, in ordering restitution in the
amount of $9,104.35. The trial court's failure to comply with the statutory requirements
and case law compels reversal of this matter and remand for further proceedings.
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2. The Analysis Set Forth in Monson and Robertson/Labrum Supports Review of
This Issue Under the Plain-Error Doctrine.
The state claims that in the lower court, Weeks did not properly preserve his claim
that the court failed to comply with Subsections 76-3-20 l(8)(c) and (4)(d) in ordering
restitution. (S.B. at 15-16.) Yet, Weeks objected to the imposition of restitution pursuant
to § 76-3-201. (Case No. 2830:37; Case No. 3049:41; Case No. 3239:39; andR. 60.)
Weeks requested a restitution hearing on the matter, which should have been provided to
accommodate consideration of the factors set forth in § 76-3-20 l(8)(c). The issue was
properly preserved for purposes of appeal.
The error was plain and obvious. In the alternative, Weeks asserts that this Court
may review the trial court's failure to consider the statutory factors under the plain-error
doctrine. (Brief of Appellant at 19 n. 5.) The state disputes application of that doctrine
on the basis that the error was not obvious: "Here, neither statute nor case law requires
the trial court to make specific findings on defendant's financial condition before
ordering restitution." (S.B. at 17.) The state is incorrect. The statute mandates that the
trial court "make the reasons for the [restitution] decision a part of the record" at the time
that it orders restitution. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(d).
Likewise, Utah case law in effect at the time of sentencing in this case provided
that "the trial court must take the additional step of explicitly noting on the record the
reasons for the [restitution] decision it reached, reflecting the detailed factors listed in the
statute," Robertson. 932 P.2d at 1234, including (1) the defendant's financial resources
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and the burden that restitution will impose on defendant's other obligations; (2)
defendant's ability to pay restitution; (3) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of
restitution payments; and (4) other circumstances which make restitution inappropriate.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(8)(c) (Supp. 1998).
Furthermore, in Monson, although defendant did not object when the Board
failed to consider the four statutory factors, the Utah Supreme Court reviewed the issue
on the merits and reversed the matter for further proceedings. Monson, 928 P.2d at
1028-29. The supreme court found that "[the] record in this case does not demonstrate
that the Board considered the statutory factors because it does not contain any
explanation of the reasons the Board ordered Monson to pay restitution." Monson, 928
P.2d at 1028. The record in Weeks' case likewise is silent on the matter.
Finally, the supreme court's discussion of the issue in Robertson relies on State v.
Labrum, 925 P.2d 937 (Utah 1996), for support. In Labrum, the Utah Supreme Court
ruled that where a statute requires a trial court to make specific findings on the record in
connection with a ruling, the trial court's failure to comply with the plain language of the
statute constitutes plain and obvious error. Id.at 940-41.3 In Robertson, the supreme
court recognized that the language of the Utah restitution statute is plain: the trial court
must explicitly note on the record its reasons for ordering restitution, taking into
consideration the four statutory factors. Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1234. Thus, where the

3 Weeks does not claim that the trial court was required to make written findings.
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requirement is explicit in the statute, Robertson and Labrum support application of the
plain-error analysis to find that the trial court obviously erred in failing to comply with
the statute. See Labrum, 925 P.2d at 940-41; Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1234.
The error was prejudicial. The state does not dispute that Weeks suffered
prejudice under the plain-error doctrine. Indeed, because the trial court failed to take the
factors into consideration in ordering restitution in the amount of $9,104.35, there is no
assurance that imposition of restitution was appropriate in this case.
In accordance with Robertson and Monson, "the appropriate remedy" is to order
the trial court to comply with the statutory provisions of Section 76-3-201, "by giving
[defendant] an explanation of its decision which demonstrates that it has taken into
account the appropriate statutory factors." Monson, 928 P.2d at 1028. Weeks
respectfully requests that this Court reverse and remand the matter for further
proceedings consistent with the statutory mandates of Section 76-3-20 l(8)(c) and (4)(d).
CONCLUSION
In this case, Weeks was entitled to a "full hearing" on the issue of restitution, and
to a review of the information underlying the alleged restitution amount. In addition,
Weeks was entitled to have the trial court consider the factors set forth in § 76-3201(8)(c) in assessing restitution. Weeks respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
restitution award since it is based on unreliable information, or in the alternative, vacate
the order and remand the case for a "full hearing" and/or appropriate findings.
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